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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
GORDON JONES, n, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Civil Action 
File No. 20 l 7CV294369 
V. 
IRONWOOD CAPITAL PARTNERS.LLC. 
TIMBERVEST, LLC, 
TEP INVESTORS, LLC, 
IRONWOOD HOLDINGS, LLC, 
JOEL BARTH SHAPIRO, 
WALTER W1LLIAM 
ANTHONY BODEN, ur, and 
DONALD DA YID ZELL, JR., 
Bus. Case Div. 2 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL .JUDGMENT ON THE 
PLEADINGS AND FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT 
This action comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Judgment on the 
Pleadings and for a More Definite Statement. Having considered the pleadings, the parties' 
memoranda in support of and opposition to the motion, and argument of counsel during an 
October 4, 20 l 8 hearing in this matter, the Court finds as follows: 
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS 
This litigation involves a number of disputes between current and former co-members of 
various limited liability companies. Plaintiff Gordon Jones, II ("Jones") and Defendants Joel 
Barth Shapiro ("Shapiro"). Walter William Anthony Boden, II[ ("Boden"), and Donald David 
Zell, Jr. ("Zell") ( collectively "Individual Defendants") are current and former members of 
several corporate entities through which the four carried out their business.' Jones and the 
Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Other Relief ("Complaint"), 1 I. 
Individual Defendants are members of Defendant TEP Investors ("TEPI") with each holding a 
2 l.75% interest.' Jones was a manager and officer of Ironwood Capital Partners, LLC 
("Ironwood") and was also a member of lronwood until December 2013 when he allegedly sold 
his 25% interest to Shapiro in exchange for cash as well as a promissory note for $425,000 that 
remains outstanding.' Finally, Jones was an officer of Timbervest, LLC (''Timbervest") until he 
was terminated in December 2015. 
AT & T Litigation and Settlement 
In May 2015, non-party AT&T and related entities (collectively "AT&T") filed suit 
against Timbervest, Jones, and the Individual Defendants in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas ("AT&T Litigation")." The plaintiffs in that case sought relief for the 
named defendants' alleged "pattern of fraud and concealment. including [d]efendants' blatantly 
improper and unlawful use of the assets of [plaintiffs' benefit plans] for [d]efendants' own 
personal interests.t" The parties to the AT&T Litigation discussed settlement during the fall and 
winter of 2015. According to Jones, throughout this settlement negotiation period, he "made 
clear" to the Jndividual Defendants and Timbervest that he was not willing to pay a pro rata 
share of any settJement and that he did not waive his rights to indemnification, stating so in an 
email Jones sent to the Individual Defendants on Dec. 17, 2015.6 
Complaint. ~5. 
Complaint, ~6. 
Complaint,~ 18. See AT&T Services. Inc .• in its capacity as named fiduciary or the AT&T Pension Benefit 
Plan. the AT&T Umbrella Benefit Plan I. the AT&T Umbrella Benefit Plan 2, and New Forestry, LLC v. 
Timbervest. LLC. Joel Barth Shapiro. Walter William Anthonv Boden. Ill. Donald David Zell, Jr .• and Gordon 
Jones. II, United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Dallas Division, No. 3: 15-cv-01454-D. 
5 Defendants' Second Amended Defenses, Answer. and Counterclaims to Plaintiff's Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment and Other Relief ("Defs' Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim"), Ex. A ("AT&T 
Litigation Complaint") at~ I. 
6 Complaint, 119. 
2 
The fol lowing day. the parties to the AT&T Litigation signed a confidential settlement 
agreement which Jones asserts he signed "at Timbervest's request" ("AT&T Settlement").7 
Pursuant to the AT&T Settlement, Plaintiff, the lndividual Defendants and Timbervest agreed to 
make a $6 million settlement payment. It is undisputed that the settlement payment was made. 
However, Jones to date has refused to pay any portion of the settlement. Timbervest and the 
Individual Defendants have demanded that Jones pay his portion of the AT&T Settlement and 
have allegedly threatened to "claw-back" attorney's fees and expenses paid on Jones' behalf in 
connection with the AT&T Litigation. 
Current Litigation 
On Aug. 21, 2017, Plaintiffs Jones initiated this action seeking a declaration that be is 
entitled to indemnification for any attorneys' fees, expenses, or settlement-payment obligations 
arising from the AT&T Litigation ( count I). Jones also asserts claims for: breach of the TEPI 
Operating Agreement and conversion. asserted against TEPI and its managers (Ironwood 
Holdings and the f ndividuaJ Defendants) for withholding from Jones a distribution that was paid 
to all other TEPJ members (counts I1 and lll); breach of fiduciary duty asserted against Ironwood 
Holdings and the Individual Defendants (count IV); breach of contract asserted against Shapiro 
for failing to pay the promissory note he executed in relation to his purchase of Jones' 
membership interest in Ironwood (count V); conversion asserted against Timbervest for refusing 
to return two paintings that allegedly belong to Jones (count VJ): and attorneys' fees and 
expenses of litigation (count VIJ). 
The Individual Defendants have asserted counterclaims against Jones, including a claim 
for a declaration that Jones is not entitled to indemnification and is obligated to pay his share of 
the AT&T Settlement payment ( count T). Defendants also assert the following claims arising 
Complaint, ~20. 
3 
from Jones' failure to pay any portion of the AT&T Settlement: breach of contract (count IT); 
promissory estoppel (count III); unjust enrichment (count IV); quantum meruit (count V); fraud 
based upon Jones' alleged misrepresentations regarding his intent to pay h.is share of the AT&T 
Settlement ( count VI); and attorneys' fees and expenses under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-1 I ( count VTI). 
On Dec. 13, 2017, Jones filed his Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings as to both 
parties' declaratory judgment actions. which also included a Motion for More Definite Statement 
as to Defendants' fraud counterclaim. The parties appeared for a hearing on Jones· motions on 
Oct. 4, 2018, whereupon the Court heard argument from both sides. 
ANALYSrs 
I. Standard on a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
"After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party 
may move for judgment on the pleadings." O.C.G.A. § 9-1 l-12(c). "[W]hen deciding a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings, the issue is whether the undisputed facts appearing from the 
pleadings entitle the movant Lo judgment as a matter of law." Southwest Health & Wellness. 
L.L.C. v. Work, 282 Ga. App. 619, 623, 639 S.E.2d 570, 575 (2006) (citing Holsapple v. Smith, 
267 Ga. App. 17, 20( 1 ), 599 S.E.2d 28 (2004)). Thus, '·[t]he grant of [ such a motion] under 
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(c) is proper only where there is a complete failure to state a cause of action 
or defense." Schumacher v. City of Roswell, 344 Ga. App. 135, 138, 809 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2017) 
(quoting Caldwell v. Church, 341 Ga. App. 852, 855-856 (2), 857 (2) (a), 802 S.E.2d 835 
(2017). 
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and 
warrants ... judgment on the pleadings "only if ... its allegations 'discJose 
with certainty' that no set of facts consistent with the allegations could be 
proved that would entitle the plaintiff to the relief he seeks." Benedict v. 
State Farm Bartl<. FSB. 309 Ga. App. 133, 134(1), 709 S.E.2d 314 (2011) 
(citation omitted). "Put another way, 'if, within the framework of the 
4 
[pleading], evidence may be introduced which will sustain a grant of 
relief...the [pleading] is sufficient.'?' ld. 
Bush v. Bank of New York Mellon, 313 Ga. App. 84, 89, 720 S.E.2d 370,374 (2011). If the 
pleadings raise "material issues of fact", the motion for judgment on the pleadings must be 
denied. Smith v. Wheeler, 233 Ga. 166, 167,210 S.E.2d 702. 704 (1974). 
for purposes of the motion, "all well-pleaded material allegations by the nonmovant are 
taken as true, and all denials by the movant are taken as false. But the trial court need not adopt a 
party's legal conclusions based on these facts." Southwest Health & Wellness. L.L.C., 282 Ga. 
App. at 623 (citation omitted). "[I]n considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a trial 
court may consider exhibits attached to and incorporated into the pleadings, including exhibits 
attached to the complaint or the answer." Schumacher v. City of Roswell, 344 Ga. App. at 138 
(citing Caldwell, 34 l Ga. App. at 857(2)(a)). 
IL Discussion and Conclusions of Law 
A. Claim and counterclaim seeking declaratory relief 
With respect to his claim seeking a declaratory judgment, Jones asserts he is entitled to 
indemnification from Defendants Timbervest and Ironwood for any fees, expenses, or settlement 
amounts he may be obligated to pay in connection with the AT&T Litigation.8 Defendants, in 
turn, seek a declaration that Jones is not entitled to any indemnification and that he, therefore, is 
"obligated to pay his share of the settlement payment, as well as other damages suffered as a 
result of his refusal to pay. "9 
The indemnification provision in the Timbervest Operating Agreement states in pertinent 
part: 
9 
Complaint,~~ 26, 36. 
Defs' Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim, ~17. 
5 
4.08 Indemnification 
(a) Right to Indemnification. Subject to the limitations and conditions 
provided in this Section 4.08, the Company shall indemnify, defend and 
hold harmless, to the fullest extent permitted by the Act['°1, each Person 
who was or is made a party ... or is involved in any threatened, pending, or 
completed action, suit or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, 
administrative, arbitrative, or investigative, and whether formal or 
informal (hereinafter a "Proceeding"), or any appeal in such a Proceeding 
or any inquiry or investigation that could lead to such a Proceeding, by 
reason of the fact that such Person ... is or was a Manager, Member, or 
officer of the Company ... (any such Person entitled to indemnification 
under this Section 4.08 referred to as an "Indemnified Person"), against 
judgments, penalties (including, without limitation, excise and similar 
taxes and punitive damages), fines, settlements, and reasonable expenses 
(including, without limitation, costs of suit and reasonable expert witness 
and attorneys' fees and expenses) actually incurred by such lndemnified 
Person in connection with a Proceeding. The indemnification under this 
Section 4.08 shall continue as to an r ndemnified Person who has ceased to 
be a Manager, Member or officer of the Company ... The rights granted 
pursuant to this Section 4.08 shall be deemed contract rights, and no 
amendment modification. or repeal of this Section 4.08 shall have the 
effect of limiting or denying such rights with respect to actions taken or 
Proceedings arising prior to any such amendment, modification, or repeal. 
It is expressly acknowledged that the indemnification provided in this 
Section 4.08 could involve indemnification for negligence or under 
theories of strict liability; provided, however, that notwithstanding any 
other provision of this Agreement to the contrary, a Person shall not be 
indemnified by the Company against any judgments, penalties, fines, 
settlements, and expenses incurred by such Person that arises in 
connection with or as a result of intentional misconduct or knowing 
violation of law by such Person or from any transaction in violation or 
breach by such Person of any provision of this Agreement. 
(Emphasis in italics added). 
The indemnification provisions in the Ironwood Operating Agreement state in pertinent 
part: 
Section 5.10 Indemnity of the Managers, Employees, and Other 
Agents. To the fullest extent permitted by the Georgia Act1111 the 
10 Under the Tirnbervesr Operating Agreement, the "Act" means the Georgia Limited Liability Company Act. 
See Timbervcst Operating Agreement, § 1.01. 
11 Under the Ironwood Operating Agreement, the "Georgia Act" means the Georgia Limited Liability 
Company Act. See Ironwood Operating Agreement, Art. I alp. 3. 
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Company shall indemnify the Managers and its officers, if any, from and 
against all costs of defense (including reasonable fees), judgments, fines, 
and amounts paid iJ1 settlement suffered by a Manager because a Manager 
was made a party to an action because the Manager is or was a Manager 
or an Officer of the Company or an officer, director. partner. or manager 
of another Person at the request of the Company, and make advances for 
expenses to such Managers and officers with respect to such matters to the 
maximum extent permitted under applicable law. 
(Emphasis in italics added). 
Moreover, the indemnification provisions summarized above expressly reference and are 
governed by the Georgia Limited Liability Company Act (hereinafter "Georgia LLC Act"). 
Under the Georgia LLC Act, subject to the standards and restrictions, if any, set forth in an 
LLC's articles of organization or written operating agreement, an LLC may "indemnify and hold 
harmless any member or manager or other person from and against any and all claims and 
demands whatsoever arising in connection with the [LLC]." O.C.G.A. § 14-11-306. However, 
"no limited liability company shall have the power to indemnify any member or manager for any 
liability that may not be eliminated or limited by the articles of organization or a written 
operating agreement by reason of division (4)(A)(i) or (ii) of Code Section 14-l l-305." Id. Code 
section 14-11-305(4)(A)(i) and (ii). in turn, precludes an LLC from eliminating or limiting the 
liabi I ity of a member or manager "[fjor intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law" or 
"[fJor any transaction for which the person received a personal benefit in violation or breach of 
any provision of a written operating agreement." 
In this action, at the time of the AT&T Litigation, Jones was an officer of Timbervest and 
a manager and officer of lronwood. Thus, Jones contends that he is entitled to indemnification 
under both the Timbervest and Ironwood Operating Agreements because he was an officer or a 
manager at the time of the relevant events and the reason that he was "made a party" to the 
AT&T Litigation was because of his work as an officer or manager. 
7 
Defendants on the other hand argue that under the Timbervest indemnification provision 
there is an exception for settlements and expenses incurred that "arises in connection with or as a 
result of intentional misconduct or knowing violation of law by such Person." The Ironwood 
indemnification provision has similar limiting language. Further, both Operating Agreements are 
subject to the Georgia LLC Act which precludes indemnification for a member or manager's 
"intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law." 
ln the AT&T Litigation. Jones was named and charged in his individual capacity as a 
defendant for allegedly defrauding AT&T. Pursuant to the AT&T Litigation Complaint, the 
action 
[sought] relief for Defendants· pattern of fraud and concealment, including 
Defendants' blatantly improper and unlawful use of the assets of the 
AT&T Pension Benefit Plan, the AT&T Umbrella Benefit Plan I, and the 
AT&T Umbrella Benefit Plan 2 (collectively, the "Plans"), for 
Defendants' own personal interests. Defendants' actions were undertaken 
in breach of their fiduciary duties pursuant to ERISA and the agreement 
between Tirnbervest and AT&T Services regarding the management of the 
Plans' assets, and in contravention of the provisions of ERlSA regarding 
h'b' d . 12 pro 1 ite transactions. 
Notably, AT&T alleged that Jones participated in the wrongdoing. Specifically, AT&T 
alleged that the named defendants orchestrated a "sale/re-purchase scheme" whereby property of 
the AT&T Plans was "land bank] eel]" and purchased by a Timbervest related fund at less that 
market value, 13 a transaction that allegedly was "reviewed and approved" by Jones and others.'! 
A T &T also alleged the defendants received and fraudulently concealed unauthorized real estate 
commissions related to the sale of assets of the Plans15 and shared i11 the proceeds received 
·~ 
IJ 
J.I 
15 
AT & T Litigation Complaint, ~ I. 
&at ~26-40. 
&at ~32. 
kl at~~ 43-54 
8 
therefrom. 16 Further, the defendants allegedly used assets of the Plans held in various trusts to 
build a hunting lodge and make other improvements to property owned by the Plan and then used 
those improvements "for their own personal enjoyment and benefil."17 
Additionally, the AT&T Litigation Complaint references an administrative enforcement 
action before the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.18 In the enforcement 
action an administrative law judge found all the defendants guilty of gross misconduct, finding 
that each of the Defendants intentionally defrauded AT&T in connection with the management 
of assets that belong to retirement plans governed by ERISA and breached fiduciary duties owed 
to AT&T. 19 
Although Plaintiff Jones asserts there has not been any conclusive finding that he 
engaged in intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law, the pleadings present a dispute 
of material facts regarding the allegations made in the AT&T Litigation and ultimately with 
respect to Plaintiff's rights to indemnification. Further, in their Second Amended Answer and 
Counterclaims, Defendants assert defenses of waiver and estoppel based upon Jones' alleged 
promises to pay a 25% portion of the AT&T settlement payment-representations which Jones 
denies making. 20 Given all of the above, the Court finds there are disputes of material facts that 
cannot be resolved as a matter of law based solely on the pleadings. Thus, the Court hereby 
DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to the parties' 
claims for declaratory relief (count I of Plaintiffs Complaint and count T of Defendants' Second 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim). 
16 &at ~51. 
&at~ 64. 
Defs' Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim, ~2. 
19 Defs' Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim, ~2, Ex. A. See In the Matter ofTimbervest. LLC, Joel 
Barth Shapiro. Walter William Anthony Boden, Ill. Donald David Zell. Jr. and Gordon Jones. 11, United States of 
America before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Adm in istrati ve Proceeding File No. 3-15519. 
20 See Second Amended Answer, Second Defense; Jones' Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, p. 8, 
11. 4. 
17 
18 
9 
B. Fraud claim 
Plaintiff Jones has also moved for a more definite statement with respect to Defendants' 
counterclaim asserting fraud ( count VI). "In order to prove fraud, the plaintiff must establish 
five elements: (1) a false representation by a defendant, (2) scienter, (3) intention to induce the 
plaintiff to act or refrain from acting, (4) justifiable reliance by plaintiff, and (5) damage to 
plaintiff" Engelman v. Kessler, 340 Ga. App. 239, 246, 797 S.E.2d 160, 166(2017), cert. denied 
(Aug. 14, 2017) (citation omitted). "[A]lthough most elements of most claims can be pied in 
general terms, so long as they give fair notice of the nature of the claims to the defendant, all 
allegations of fraud "shall be stated with particularity." Bush v. Bank of New York Mellon, 313 
Ga. App. 84, 90, 720 S.E.2d 370,374 (2011) (quoting O.C.G.A. §9-11-9(b)). 
Here, Defendants allege that during the negotiations related to the AT&T Settlement 
Jones misled Defendants to think he would pay his share of the settlement despite knowing he 
was not going to pay and knowing that Defendants would rely on his misrepresentations in 
agreeing to the settlement. Defendants assert they in fact relied on Jones' assurances during the 
negotiations, including his assurance that he planned to contribute to the settlement, and in 
reliance thereon Defendants agreed to the settlement and paid Jones' share to complete the 
AT&T Settlement." According to Defendants, "Jones secured commitments from [them] to 
settle based on Jones' assurance that he would pay his share, and only after all were committed 
to complete the settlement. did Jones announce his refusal to pay.''22 The Court finds 
Defendants· allegations of fraud have been pied with sufficient particularity to state a claim for 
relief. Thus, Plaintiff's Motion for a More Definite Statement with respect to 
Defendants/Counterclaimants' fraud claim is also DENIED. 
21 
22 
Defs' Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim. 1~ 27-30. 
.!s1 al ~3 I. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing. Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings and 
Motion for a More Definite Statement are hereby DENIED. 
SO ORDER.ED this ll day of October, 20 I 8. 
DGE 
Metro Atlan a Business Case Division 
Fulton County Superior Court 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
Served upon registered service contacts through eFileGA 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Attorneys for Defendants ' 
James W. Cobb Louis R. Cohan 
Benjamin W. Checsbro Riley W. Snider 
Ashley C. Brown 
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